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RESUMEN
Este trabajo aporta evidencia experimental sobre la relación entre la aversión al
riesgo y las creencias de los jugadores sobre las acciones que tomarán sus rivales en
un juego del Dilema de Presos. Los resultados más relevantes son: (i) los aversos al
riesgo tienden a pensar que su rival no cooperará, (ii) los amantes del riesgo dan
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mayor probabilidad de cooperación a sus rivales y (iii) finalmente, los sujetos que
consideran que su rival es racional son más aversos que aquéllos que piensan que su
oponente cometerá algún error.
Palabras clave: teoría de la utilidad esperada, riesgo estratégico, dilema de presos.
ABSTRACT
In this paper we obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between individu-
als’ risk attitudes and individuals’ beliefs on their rival’s choices in the Prisoners’
Dilemma game. We find that (i) risk-averse subjects seem to think that their oppo-
nent will defect, (ii) risk-loving individuals tend to think that their opponent will
cooperate with higher probabilities, and (iii) finally, those subjects who believe that
the rival will behave rationally are more risk averse than those subjects that believe
that the rival will make a mistake, who on average are risk neutral.
Keywords: Expected utility theory, Risk attitudes, Strategic risk, Prisoners’Dilemma.
JEL Classification: C91, C71, D81
1. INTRODUCTION
Economic theory rationalises human behaviour by assuming that it is the output
of an optimisation problem, in which the decision maker maximises his utility. To this
end, it is assumed that economic agents are endowed with a utility function which
complies with several properties. In strategic environments, decision makers are
assumed to form beliefs about their rivals’ intended play and to act accordingly, i.e.,
by maximising expected utility. However, economic theory does not impose any con-
ditions to the factors affecting the formation of beliefs. Even more, this seems an
empirical rather than a theoretical question.
In this paper we perform an experimental investigation about the relationship (if
any) between some properties of the utility function and the beliefs hold by decision
makers in strategic environments. In particular, we are interested in the interaction
between attitudes toward risk (pure risk) and beliefs in strategic environments
(strategic risk). We will analyse this interaction in one of the most popular games:
The Prisoners’ Dilemma.
We will use the experimental results reported in Brañas-Garza and Morales (2004,
BGM hereafter). These authors analyse subjects’ behaviour in two games in order to
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2 Although this design may generate some order effects, BGM treatment 2 (not reported here)
rejects any rank-order effects. BGM treatment 2 consist only of a PDG without any previous game
get knowledge of subjects’ beliefs on rival’s cooperativeness in the Prisoners’ Dilem-
ma game. In this paper we complement that analysis by incorporating a third «game»
included in those experimental sessions but not reported in BGM. The third game was
precisely aimed at getting knowledge of subjects’ attitude toward risk.
Our findings indicate that attitudes toward risk are related to beliefs in strategic
environment. We do observe that subjects with more risk aversion think that their
rival will defect in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. In contrast, risk-loving subjects
think that their opponent will cooperate with positive probability. Also, those subjects
who believe that the rival will behave rationally are more risk-averse than those sub-
jects that believe that the rival will make a mistake, who on average are risk neutral.
Up to now, there exists little evidence on the existence of any relationship between
the strategic uncertainty and the attitudes toward risk. Sabater and Georgantzís (2002)
study the role of risk aversion on players’ behaviour in repeated prisoners’ dilemma
games. They find that risk aversion relates negatively with the disposition to cooper-
ate. Specifically, the most risk-averse players choose Nash strategies more often than
the less risk-averse ones. However, these authors focus on the importance of the risk
aversion on the players’ actions, not on the beliefs they hold, like us.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 explains the experimen-
tal design describing in detail the methodology and procedures. Section 2 presents the
main results obtained from the experiment and section 3 concludes.
2. DESIGN
Our research is based on the comparison of a subject’s responses across two par-
allel situations, both involving uncertainty and risk. To rationalise behaviour, we will
assume that the decision-makers behave as maximising expected utility.
Under this within-subject design, first we propose an experimental setting to test
for our individuals’ risk attitudes. Second, subjects face two different strategic games:
An Entry game and a Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
This second setting allows us to estimate the subjects’ beliefs about their rival’s
behaviour. Each of the two experimental settings is described in the following sub-
sections2.
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(for 55 subjects) and not any difference is found between the data used in this paper and treatment 2
data set. Both the Mann-Whitney (Z = –0, 78; p = 0, 43) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Z = 0, 30; p =
1, 00) tests do no reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution between data from treatment 1 (used
here) and treatment 2 (rank-order control).
3 The characteristics of this game are similar to those of the games used in the second experi-
mental setting.
2.1. Testing for attitudes toward risk
In decision making under risk, there exists a wide variety of elicitation and clas-
sification techniques according to the attitudes toward risk (asking individuals the
willingness to pay, the willingness to accept or using a lottery choice procedure). The
experimental literature shows that subjects exhibit a significant degree of hetero-
geneity in the attitudes toward risk and that this is an important issue to take into
account in games like auctions, negotiation or investment decisions. It is important
to point out that our objective here is to control the individual behaviour under risk
and to obtain a classification based on the risk attitudes distribution, not to measure
attitudes toward risk.
To test for individual risk attitudes, we consider a slightly modified version of
Holt and Laury (2002). Concretely, we ask subjects to choose between a sure amount
of money and a lottery. However, in contrast to the general tendency in the literature,
we do not offer directly the lottery but the following two-player game3:
In this game, individuals were told that they were the player 1 and that player 2’s
choice would be selected by the toss of a fair coin; hence, player 2 would play each
action with a 50% of probability. The sequence players followed was: First, they had
to decide which strategy they will play and, second, they had to fill in the following
payments card (see figure 2).
Figure 1. Game 0
E NE
E 4,4 8,3
NE 3,8 0,0
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As we can see, the payments card is a set of ten decisions where each of them
consists of choosing between a sure amount of money (ranked from 1 to 10) or play-
ing the game. We assume that when filling the payment card, the individual consid-
ers that the relevant row of the above game is the one corresponding to his chosen
strategy. Hence, the game reduces to a lottery and therefore, an individual would
choose to play the lottery if the sure monetary payoff is lower than the certain equiv-
alent of the lottery. Note that the amount of money at which the individual switches
from playing the game to the sure amount of money is precisely the certain equiva-
lent of the lottery, which we will named the elicited value of the game.
As an example, consider the dominant strategy for the player 1. It gives either 4
or 8 with the same probability. This implies that under Expected Utility Theory, we
can only characterise the respondents’ attitudes toward risk into this interval. So, a
value of 6 would mean that he is a risk neutral person. If the value is lower than 6,
the individual would be risk averse and risk loving if his value was greater than 6.
There exist however two experimental behavioural patterns under risk that the
expected utility framework does not explain, that is, the attraction to and the repul-
sion from chance —see Pope (1997) for a discussion of the «utility and disutility of
chance» from both a descriptive and normative point of view and Albers et al. (2000)
for experimental evidence for attractions to chance. In our experiment, an elicited
value smaller than the minimum available payoff might reflect repulsion from
chance. In contrast, an elicited value greater than the maximum available payoff
might reflect an attraction to chance.
In this research, rather than excluding these individuals we will incorporate them
in our analysis into two categories: Repulsion and Attraction from chance. Hence, we
Figure 2. Payment Card
1ST CHOICE: PLAY OR 1 EURO FOR SURE
2ND CHOICE: PLAY OR 2 EURO FOR SURE
3RD CHOICE: PLAY OR 3 EURO FOR SURE
4TH CHOICE: PLAY OR 4 EURO FOR SURE
5TH CHOICE: PLAY OR 5 EURO FOR SURE
6TH CHOICE: PLAY OR 6 EURO FOR SURE
7TH CHOICE: PLAY OR 7 EURO FOR SURE
8TH CHOICE: PLAY OR 8 EURO FOR SURE
9TH CHOICE: PLAY OR 9 EURO FOR SURE
10TH CHOICE: PLAY OR 10 EURO FOR SURE
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might have up to five categories of risk attitudes to classify individuals according to
the elicited value in game 0: Repulsion (1-3), Aversion (4-5), Neutrality (6), Loving
(7-8) and Attraction (0-10).
2.2. Eliciting values on rival’s cooperativeness 
on the Prisoners’ Dilemma
This section summarises the methodology followed by BGM. The experiment
involves two games: An Entry game and a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Individuals
were first asked to choose the strategy (Enter or Not enter) in each game and, after
playing each game, they were invited to fill in the payments card. Figure 3 plots the
payoffs matrices of both games.
Two remarks are in place.
First, note that game 1 is the same as game 0 used to characterize the players’ risk
attitudes. However in game 1, the player 2 is a subject randomly selected among all
participants and therefore player 1’s subjective beliefs on player 2’s actions play an
important role in player 1’s behaviour. In particular, his belief or his subjective prob-
ability of player 2 choosing the dominated strategy critically affects his value of the
game elicited by the payments card.
Second, notice that the unique difference between games 1 and 2 is the outcome
yielded by the pair of the dominated strategies (NE, NE). In particular, both games
are dominance solvable and the unique prediction based on dominance criteria is that
players will choose the dominant strategy E. But in the Entry game there is no scope
for cooperation whereas in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game comes out the possibility of
cooperation.
Our methodology is to compare players’ elicited values across these two games.
Note that any difference in values, i.e. any change in beliefs, can be interpreted as
motivated by the appearance of the cooperative dilemma. Hence, the comparison of
Figure 3. Game 1 & Game 2
Entry Game Prisoner’s Dilemma
E NE
E 4,4 8,3
NE 3,8 0,0
E NE
E 4,4 8,3
NE 3,8 7,7
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4 In BGM there was also a classification according to played actions. In this paper, however, we
do not draw such distinction because our emphasis is on beliefs rather than actions.
5 Brosig (2002) performs a different classification of individual predictions about rival actions
in PD games. These predictions are based on pre-play communication without monitoring.
6 Using Wilcoxon non-parametric test for 2-related samples we observe that there exist strong
differences (x2= –2, 79; p= 0, 00) between valuation in game 0 (risk aversion test) and game 1 (entry
game). This result illustrates that individuals perceive the difference between playing against a
machine and against a human rival.
players’ values across games provides us with information about beliefs and also
about how players regard the possibility of cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.
As a result of the comparison between the elicited values across the two games, sub-
jects can be classified according to the following taxonomy4:
• Rational rival: This individual thinks that his rival will play the rational strat-
egy in both games with probability 1. This implies that the elicited value in
both games corresponds to the minimum available payoff5.
• Trembling-hand rival: This individual believes that the rival will use the same
completely mixed strategy in both games. That is, he thinks that with the same
positive probability, the rival will deviate from the rational strategy in both
games.
• Payoffs rival: This individual thinks that his rival will use a different mixed
strategy in each game. That is, he supposes that the social issue attached to the
Prisoners’ Dilemma game will affect his rival’s behaviour.
We will now review our experimental findings in the next section.
3. RESULTS
We first present a table displaying the number of experimental subjects in each
category. Note that individuals are classified by both beliefs and risk attitudes. Quite
fortunately, there are subjects in every category with the unique exception of Ratio-
nal rival-Attraction players (see table 1)6.
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There are two obvious ways to analyse the relationship between attitudes toward
risk and beliefs. The first one would be the study of the distribution of beliefs (strate-
gic risk) conditional to risk attitudes. The second one would be to explore the distri-
bution of risk aversion within each group of individuals ranked by their beliefs.
In the next sections we undertake both.
3.1. Strategic Risk conditional to Risk Attitudes
In this section we first cluster subjects conditional to their attitude toward risk.
This analysis will help us to understand whether risk attitude affects the formation of
beliefs on rival’s actions in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
Table 2 and Figure 4 illustrate the experimental results.
Figure 4 give us a clearer picture. Rational rival individuals are more probable in
categories of enhanced risk aversion while T-Hand rival subjects are more numerous
in risky stadiums. The former shows a decreasing trend along the risk axis and the
later run in opposite direction. However, Payoff Rival subjects do not follow any
clear trend, being equally distributed along the risk intervals.
Table 1. Experimental Results
RATIONAL T-HAND PAYOFF TOTAL
REPULSION 3 1 2 6
AVERSION 10 7 16 33
NEUTRAL 4 9 12 25
LOVING 2 9 6 17
ATTRACTION 0 2 1 3
TOTAL 19 28 37 84
Table 2. Beliefs By Risk Att. (%)
RATIONAL T-HAND PAYOFF TOTAL
REPULSION 50,0% 16,7% 35,3% 6
AVERSION 30,3% 21,2% 48,5% 33
NEUTRAL 16,0% 36,0% 48,0% 25
LOVING 11,8% 52,9% 33,3% 17
ATTRACTION 0,0% 66,7% 33,3% 3
TOTAL 19 28 37 84
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7 Recall that we use rational in the traditional sense (EUT).
By focusing on rational rival players, we can get knowledge of the evolution of
the fraction of the population who believes that their rival will behave rationally in
the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Our result shows that the higher the risk aversion, the high-
er the belief that the rival will be rational. Hence, there is positive correlation between
risk aversion and beliefs on rival’s rationality7.
The evolution of T-Hand players suggests that the higher the risk love, the high-
er the belief that the rival will make a mistake and play the cooperative action.
Finally, by considering the evolution of payoffs rival players we can get knowl-
edge of the fraction of the population who believes that cooperation is an issue for
their rival in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Our results suggest that there is no correlation
between this belief and the attitude toward risk.
Our interpretation of the above results is as follows. Notice that in the Prisoners’
Dilemma game and, regardless of the action played by a given individual, the higher
his belief on the rival playing the cooperative action, the higher his payoff. Hence, it
Figure 4
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Repul. Aversion Neutral Loving Atract.
Rational T-Hand Payoff
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is as if a risk averse player is pessimistic about getting a good payoff whereas a risk
loving player is somehow optimistic about it.
3.2. Risk Attitudes conditional to Strategic Risk
In this section we perform a complementary analysis. We classify subjects by
beliefs and then we characterize their attitudes toward risk, i.e. specifically we
analyse their certain equivalent. This sort of analysis is appropriate to detect differ-
ent attitudes toward risk among different group of individuals.
Next table illustrates the main descriptive statistics for each group: Rational rival,
T-Hand rival and Payoff rival subjects.
A simple visual inspection reveals differences on the average certain equivalent
among groups (see row 2, table 3). T-Hand rival subjects are, on average, risk-neu-
tral but both Payoffs rival and Rational rival subjects are risk-averse.
The statistical analysis confirms differences among distributions. Kruskall- Wal-
lis non-parametric test for k = 3 unrelated samples rejects the null hypothesis of equal
distribution of samples (X2 =11, 56; p = 0, 00), that is, observations are not drawn
from the same population. Median test (X2 = 6, 03; p= 0, 04) also rejects for a 5% sig-
nificance level. So rational, t-hand and payoffs individuals differ in their attitudes
toward risk.
In order to clarify results we run 2-samples tests.
• Rational rival subjects vs. T-Hand rival subjects: Mann-Witney test rejects (Z=
–3, 22; p = 0, 00) equal distribution among samples; Kolmogorov-Smirnov
rejects (Z = 1, 34; p = 0, 05) for ?= 5%. Then, Rational rival and T-Hand rival
individuals are different in risk aversion.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
RATIONAL T-HAND PAYOFF
N 19 28 37
AVERAGE 4,68 6,21 5,40
MEDIAN 5 6 6
MODE 4-5 6 6
ST. DEV. 1,63 1,61 1,38
VAR. 2,67 2,61 1,91
MIN. 1 1 3
MAX. 7 10 9
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• Rational rival subjects vs. Payoff rival subjects: Mann-Witney test does not reject
(Z= –1, 39; p = 0, 16) equal distribution and Kolmogorov-Smirnov also does not
reject (Z = 0, 701; p = 0, 71) the null hypothesis. So, we do not observe differ-
ences, in risk aversion, between Rational rival and Payoff rival individuals.
• Payoff rival subjects vs. T-Hand rival subjects: Mann-Witney test rejects for ?
=1% (Z= –2, 38; p=0, 01) equal distribution among samples but Kolmogorov-
Smirnov also does not reject (Z=1, 15; p =0,, 15) the null hypothesis. Sum-
marising, there exist weak differences among T-Hand rival and Payoff rival
individuals.
Table 4 below illustrates the distribution of population (relative frequency in %)
by certain equivalents in each group.
Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative frequencies of the certain equivalent in each
group. Observe that the largest percentage of averse individuals and the smallest per-
centage of risk loving subjects are found within the Rational group. Exactly the oppo-
site to the T-Hand category which displays the largest risk loving share and the small-
est percentage of risk averse subjects.
Clearly, both groups run in the opposite direction. In the Payoff group, the risk
attitudes distribution is more balanced, subjects are distributed more uniformly along
the risk categories.
Table 4. Relative frequencies by groups (%)
REPULSION AVERSE NEUTRAL LOVING ATTRAC.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RATIONAL 5 - 10 26 26 21 10 - - -
PAYOFF - - 5 - 27 16 32 13 2 -
T-HAND 3 - - - 25 32 25 7 3 3
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have investigated empirically the relationship between attitudes
toward risk and beliefs on rival cooperativeness in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
We have found empirical evidence that risk attitudes affects the beliefs on the
rival’s choices: (i) The higher the risk aversion, the higher the belief that the rival will
behave rationally, and (ii) The higher the risk love, the higher the belief that the rival
will make a mistake and play the cooperative action.
We offer an interpretation of these findings. Notice that in the Prisoners’ Dilem-
ma game and regardless of the action played by a given individual, the higher his
belief on the rival playing the cooperative action, the higher his payoff. Hence, it is
as if a risk averse player is pessimistic about getting a good payoff whereas a risk lov-
ing player is somehow optimistic about it.
Also, in a complementary analysis, we have also found that those subjects who
believe that the rival will behave rationally are more risk averse than those subjects
that believe that the rival will make a mistake, who on average are risk neutral. Sta-
tistical analysis confirms these ideas.
Figure 5. Cumulative Frequencies
0
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Rational T-Hand Payoff
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Given that a very few research has been done in this field, this paper has intend-
ed to open a research agenda on the «connection» between beliefs and risk attitudes.
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